The equity premium designates four different concepts: Historical Equity Premium (HEP); Expected Equity Premium (EEP); Required Equity Premium (REP); and Implied Equity Premium (IEP). We highlight the confusing message in the literature regarding the equity premium and its evolution. The confusion arises from not distinguishing among the four concepts and from not recognizing that although the HEP is equal for all investors, the REP, the EEP and the IEP differ for different investors.
Introduction
The equity premium (also called market risk premium, equity risk premium, market premium and risk premium) is one of the most important, but elusive parameters in finance. Some confusion arises from the fact that the term equity premium is used to designate four different concepts:
1. Historical Equity Premium (HEP): historical differential return of the stock market over treasuries.
2. Expected Equity Premium (EEP): expected differential return of the stock market over treasuries.
3. Required Equity Premium (REP): incremental return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate required by an investor in order to hold the market portfolio 1 . It is needed for calculating the required return to equity (cost of equity). The CAPM assumes that REP and EEP are unique and that REP = EEP.
4. Implied Equity Premium (IEP): the required equity premium that arises from a pricing model and from assuming that the market price is correct. Different authors claim different relations among the four equity premiums defined above. These relationships vary widely:
• HEP = EEP = REP according to Brealey and Myers (1996) ; Copeland et al (1995) • EEP is smaller than HEP according to Copeland et al (2000, HEP-1.5 to 2%); Goedhart et al (2005, HEP-1 to 2%); Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1996, HEP-1%) ; Mayfield (2004, HEP-2 .4%); Booth (1999, Pablo Fernández Equity Premium: Historical, Expected, Required and Implied IESE Business School Smith (1926) made the first empirical estimate of the long run return on stocks (only price changes) for the most actively traded stocks from 1901 to 1922, and showed that an equity investor (even without market timing or stock selection ability) outperformed a bond investor over this period 5 . Cowles (1939) published the first empirical study carefully done on the performance of the stock market. Cowles calculated the total return to equity from 1872 to 1937 for the NYSE, documenting a positive long term equity performance. Fisher and Lorie (1964) , using for the first time the database of stock prices completed at the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), showed that the average return from a random investment in NYSE stocks from 1926 to 1964 was 9.1% a year 6 . Associates (2006) . The HEP in table 1 is the difference between the average return on the S&P 500 and the return of Gov. Bonds or T-Bills. However, Ibbotson Associates (2006, page 73) , use the income return (the portion of the total return that results from a periodic bond coupon payment) of the Gov. Bonds (5.2%) and consider that the relevant HEP during the period 1926-2005 is 7.1% (12.3-5.2). Schwert (1990) and Siegel (1994 Siegel ( , 1999 Siegel ( , 2002 Siegel ( , 2005a studied the relationship between U.S.
Estimates of the historical equity premium of the US
equity and bonds before 1926. The data on which they base their studies is less reliable than recent data, but the results are interesting, nevertheless. Ibbotson and Chen (2003 ) use 1926 historical equity returns and conclude that the expected long-term equity premium (relative to the long-term government bond yield) is 5.9% arithmetically, and 3.97% geometrically.
5 Three years after publication, the market crash happened. Benjamin Graham blamed Smith's book for inspiring an "orgy of uncontrolled speculation". 6 For a more detailed history see Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006) . 7 Siegel (1999) argues that this is because bond returns were exceptionally low after 1926, while total equity returns were relatively stable over the whole time period. 8 Standard & Poor's first developed stock price indices in 1923 and in 1927 created the Composite Index (90 stocks). On 1 March 1957, the Composite was expanded to 500 stocks and renamed S&P 500 Index (its market value was $173 billion, 85% of the value of all NYSE listed stocks). From 1926 to 1957 there were 2 different S&P Composite indexes: one was weekly and the other was daily. The S&P Composite daily covered 90 stocks until 1957; The S&P Composite weekly covered more than 400.
Pablo Fernández
Equity Premium: Historical, Expected, Required and Implied IESE Business School 6 Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006) employ a new NYSE database for 9 to estimate the U.S. equity returns and the HEP since 1792 (but they mention that dividend data is absent pre-1825, and is incomplete in the period 1825-71). Their main results are in table 4. In a very interesting article, Siegel and Schwartz (2006) calculate the return of the original S&P 500 companies since 1957 until 2003 and find that their return has been higher than the return of the S&P 9 See Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Peng (2001) , who collected U.S. stock market data by hand from 1815.
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10 . The average geometric return of the S&P 500 was 10.85% (standard deviation of 17%), while the return of the original 500 companies was 11.31% (standard deviation of 15.7%). Note that not all the authors get the same result, even for the HEP. Table 5 is a comparison of the HEP in the US according to different authors. The differences are substantial, especially for the period 1926-1957. The differences are mainly due to the stock indexes chosen. It is also important to keep in mind that the data from the 19 th century and from the first part of the 20 th century is quite poor and questionable. Table 6 shows the differences among the different indexes commonly used. Figure 1 shows that interest rates were lower than dividend yields until 1958 and than the earnings to price ratio until the 1980s. It suggests that many things have changed in the capital markets and that the last 40 years have been different than the previous ones. It is quite sensible to assume that the portfolio theory, the CAPM, the APT, the VAR analysis, the futures and options markets, the appearance of many mutual and hedge funds, the increase of investors, the legislation to protect investors, financial innovation, electronic trading, portfolio insurance, market participation,… have changed the behaviour and the risk attitudes of today's investors vs. past investors. In fact, financial markets are so different that the relative magnitude of dividend yields to interest rates has been reversed. 10 The market value of the S&P 500 companies that have survived from the original 1957 list was only 31% of the 2003 year-end S&P 500's market value. Since the S&P 500 was formulated, more than 900 new companies have been added to the index (and an equal number deleted from).
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It is interesting to look at historical data to know what happened to our grandparents (or to our great grandparents), but it is not sensible to assume that their markets and their investment behaviour were similar to ours 11 . Figure 2 shows the evolution of the 20-year rolling correlation of (dividend yield -R F ) versus R F (the yield on Government long-term bonds). Again, we may see that something has changed in the markets because that correlation after 1960 has been lower than ever before. Figure 3 shows the raw data used to calculate the correlations of Figure 2 and permits to contrast the different behavior of the markets in the periods 1871-1959 and 1960-2005 . In section 7 we analyze this data and derive implications. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the 20-year rolling HEP (arithmetic and geometric) relative to the T-Bills. It may be seen that the periods with equity returns much higher than the T-Bill rates were the 50s and the 90s. Blanchard (1993) examined the evolution of stock and bonds rates over the period 1978 to 1992 for the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the UK. He constructed 'world' rates of return (using relative GDP weights for the countries) and documented a postwar decline in the dividend yield and in various measures of the HEP. Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) Dimson et al (2006c) use a unique database to calculate the historical equity premium for 17 countries over 106 years . Their estimates (see Table 8 In a previous work Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002) show that the HEP was generally higher for the second half century: the World had 4.7% in the first half, compared to 6.2% in the second half. Table 9 contains some of the HEPs reported by different authors for the US. 12 Their database contains annual returns on stocks, bonds, bills, inflation, and currencies for 17 countries from 1900-2005, and is described in Dimson et al (2006a and 2006b) . They construct a World equity index (U.S. dollars index of 17 countries weighted by its starting-year market capitalization or by its GDP, before capitalizations were available) and a World bond index, constructed with each country weighted by its GDP. The series were compiled to avoid the survivorship bias that can arise from backfilling. Their choice of international markets was limited by their requirement to have data for the whole century.
Estimates of the Historical Equity Premium (HEP) in other countries
Expected Equity Premium (EEP)
The Expected Equity Premium (EEP) is the answer to a question we would all (especially analysts and fund managers) like to answer accurately in the short term, namely: what incremental return do I expect from the market portfolio over the risk-free rate over the next years?
Estimates of the EEP based on historical analysis presume that the historical record provides an adequate guide for future expected long-term behaviour. However, the HEP changes over time, and it is not clear why capital market data from the 19 th century or from the first half of the 20 th century may be useful in estimating expected returns in the 21st century.
Numerous papers assert that there must be an EEP common to all investors (to the representative inve stor). But it is obvious that investors do not share "homogeneous expectations" 13 and, also, that many investors do not hold the market portfolio but, rather, a subgroup of stocks and bonds 14 . Heterogeneous investors do not hold the same portfolio of risky assets; in fact, no investor must hold the market portfolio to clear the market.
We claim in section 7 that without "homogeneous expectations" there is not one EEP (but several), and there is not one REP (but several).
The Historical Equity Premium (HEP) is not a good estimator of the EEP
Although many authors consider that the equity premium is a stationary process, and then the HEP is an unbiased estimate of the EEP (unconditional mean equity premium), we do not agree with that statement: the HEP is not a good estimator of the EEP. For example, Mehra and Prescott (2003) state that
"…over the long horizon the equity premium is likely to be similar to what it has been in the past".
The magnitude of the error associated with using the HEP as an estimate of the EEP is substantial.
Shiller (2000) points out that "the future will not necessarily be like the past". Booth (1999) concludes that the HEP is not a good estimator of the EEP and estimates the later in 200 basis points smaller than the HEP 15 . Mayfield (2004) suggest that a structural shift in the process governing the volatility of market returns after the 1930s resulted in a decrease in the expected level of market risk, and concluded that EEP = HEP -2.4% = 5.9% over the yield on T-bills (4.1% over yields on T-bonds).
13 Brennan (2004) 
also admits that " different classes of investor may have different expectations about the prospective returns on equities which imply different assessments of the risk premium".
14 But, even with "homogeneous expectations" (all investors have equal EEP), the REP would not be equal for all investors. In that situation, the investors with lower REP would clear the market. 15 He also points out that the nominal equity return did not follow a random walk and that the volatility of the bonds increased significantly over the last 20 years.
Survivorship bias 16 was identified by Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) as one of the main reasons why the results based on historical analyses can be too optimistic. They pointed out that the observed return, conditioned on survival (HEP), can overstate the unconditional expected return (EEP).
However, Li and Xu (2002) show that the survival bias fails to explain the equity premium puzzle: "To have high survival bias, the probability of market survival over the long run has to be extremely small, which seems to be inconsistent with existing historical evidence". Siegel (1999, p. 13) 
Therefore, the low conditional forecasts do not necessarily lessen the burden on economic theory to
explain the large sample average of the equity return and premium over the past 130 years". Dimson et al (2003) highlight the survivorship bias relative to the market, "even if we have been successful in avoiding survivor bias within each index, we still focus on markets that survived" and concluded that the geometric EEP for the world's major markets should be 3% (5% arithmetic). Dimson et al (2006c) admit that "we cannot know today's consensus expectation for the equity premium", but they conclude that "investors expect an equity premium (relative to bills) of around 3-3½% on a geometric mean basis", substantially lower than the HEP found in their own study.
Surveys
A direct way to obtain an expectation of the equity premium is to carry out a survey of analysts or investors although Ilmanen (2003) 
Regressions
Attempts to predict the equity premium typically look for some independent lagged predictors (X) on the equity premium: Equity Premium t = a + b ·X t-1 + ε t Many predictors have been explored in the literature. Some examples are: • Dividend yield: Ball (1978) , Rozeff (1984) , Campbell (1987) , Campbell and Shiller (1988) , Fama and French (1988) , Hodrick (1992) , Campbell and Viceira (2002) , Campbell and Yogo (2003) , Lewellen (2004) , and Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004) . Cochrane (1997) has a good survey of the dividend yield prediction literature.
• The short term interest rate: Hodrick (1992).
• Earnings price and payout ratio: Campbell and Shiller (1988) , Lamont (1998) and Ritter (2005) .
• The term spread and the default spread: Avramov (2002 ), Campbell (1987 , Fama and French (1989) , and Keim and Stambaugh (1986) .
• The inflation rate (money illusion): Fama and Schwert (1977) , Fama (1981) , and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a,b) , and Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005) .
• Interest rate and dividend related variables: Ang and Bekaert (2003) .
• Book-to-market ratio: Kothari and Shanken (1997) .
• Value of high and low-beta stocks: Polk, Thompson and Vuolteenaho (2004) .
• Consumption and wealth: Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) .
• Aggregate financing activity: Baker and Wurgler (2000) and Boudoukh et al (2006) . Goyal and Welch (2006) used most of the mentioned predictors and could not identify one that would have been robust for forecasting the equity premium and, after all their analysis, they recommended "assuming that the equity premium is 'like it always has been'". They also show that most of these models have not performed well for the last thirty years, that are not stable, and that are not useful for market-timing purposes.
However, Campbell and Thompson (2005) claim that some variables (ratios, patterns, levels of sort and long term interest rates) are correlated with subsequent market returns and that "forecasting variables with significant forecasting power insample generally have a better out-of-sample performance than a forecast based on the historical average return". Siegel (2002, page 124) concluded that "the future equity premium is likely to be in the range of 2 to 3%, about one-half the level that has prevailed over the past 20 years" 18 . Siegel (2005a, page 172) affirms that "over the past 200 years, the equity risk premium has averaged about 3%". Siegel (2005b) maintains that "although the future equity risk premium is apt to be lower than it has been historically, Maheu and McCurdy (2006) claim that the US Market had "three major structural breaks (1929, 1940 and 1969) , and possibly a more recent structural break in the late 1990s", and suggest an EEP in 2004 between 4.02% and 5.1%. Wilson and Masih (2002) 3.9% Global clients Goldman Graham and Harvey (2005) 2.93% CFOs
Other estimates of the expected equity premium
Other publications Booth (1999) EEP = HEP -2% Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) 4 -6% McGrattan and Prescott (2001) near zero Arnott and Ryan (2001) near zero Arnott and Bernstein (2002) near zero Siegel (2002 Siegel ( , 2005b 2 -3%
Ibbotson ( 
Required and implied equity premium
The Required Equity Premium (REP) of an investor is the incremental return that she requires, over the risk-free rate, for investing in a diversified portfolio of shares. It is a crucial parameter in valuation and capital budgeting because the REP is the key to determining the company's required return to equity and the required return to any investment project. The HEP is misleading for predicting the REP. If there was a reduction in the REP, this fall in the discount rate led to re-pricing of stocks, thus adding to the magnitude of HEP. The HEP, then, overstates the REP.
The IEP is the implicit REP used in the valuation of a stock (or a market index) that matches the current market value with an estimate of the future cash flows to equity. Two models are widely used to calculate the IEP: the Gordon (1962) model (constant dividend growth model) and the residual income (or abnormal return) model.
According to the Gordon (1962) model, the current price per share (P 0 ) is the present value of expected dividends discounted at the required rate of return (k). If d 1 is the dividend per share expected to be received at time 1, and g the expected long term growth rate in dividends per share 19 ,
The abnormal return method is another version of the Gordon (1962) 
19 Although we say "dividends per share", we refer to equity cash flow per share: dividends, repurchases and all expected cash for the shareholders. 20 Comparing the two models, it is clear than in a growing perpetuity, D 1 = E 1 -g BV 0 . The equivalence of the two models may be seen in Fernandez (2005) Jagannathan, McGrattan and Scherbina (2000) use the Gordon model, assume that dividends will growth as fast as GNP, and come with an estimate of 3.04%. They mention that "to get the estimate up to Brealey and Myer's 9 .2%, we would need to assume nominal dividend growth of 13.2%. This is an unreasonable assumption". They also revise Welch (2000) and point out that "apparently, finance professors do not expect the equity premium to shrink". Claus and Thomas (2001) calculate the equity premium using the Gordon model and the residual income model, assuming that g is the consensus of the analysts' earnings growth forecasts for the next five years and that the dividend payout will be 50%. They also assume that the residual earnings growth after year 5 will be the current 10-year risk-free rate less 3%. With data from 1985 to 1998, they find that the IEP is smaller than the HEP, and they recommend using a REP of about 3% for the US, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and UK.
Harris and Marston (2001), using the dividend discount model and estimations of the financial analysts about long-run growt h in earnings, estimate an IEP of 7.14% for the S&P 500 above T-Bonds over the period 1982-1998. They also claim that the IEP move inversely with government interest rates, which is hard to believe.
Easton, Taylor, Shroff and Sougiannis (2002) used the residual income model with IBES data for expected growth 21 , and estimated an average IEP of 5.3% over the years . Goedhart, Koller and Wessels (2002 used the dividend discount model (considering also share repurchases), with GDP growth as a proxy for expected earnings growth and with the average inflation rate of the last 5 years as a proxy for expected inflation. 1962-1979 1990-2000 1962-1979 1995- One problem of all these estimates is that they depend on the particular assumption made for the expected growth. Fama and French (1992) report that in the period 1941-1990 an equally weighted index outperformed the value weighted (average monthly returns of 1.12% and 0.93%) in the whole period and in most sub sample periods. 23 Not to be outdone, Kadlec and Acampora (1999) 
The equity premium puzzle
The equity premium puzzle, a term coined by Mehra and Prescott (1985) , is the inability of a standard representative consumer asset pricing model, using aggregate data, to reconcile the HEP. To reconcile the model with the HEP, individuals must have implausibly high risk aversion according to standard economics models 24 . Mehra and Prescott (1985) argued that stocks should provi de at most a 0.35% premium over bills. Even by stretching the parameter estimates, Mehra and Prescott (2003) concluded that the premium should be no more than 1%. This contrasted starkly with their HEP estimate of 6.2%.
Attempts to solve the equity premium puzzle
This puzzle has lead to an extensive research effort in both macroeconomics and finance. Over the last 20 years, researchers have tried to resolve the puzzle by generalizing and adapting (weakening one or more of the assumptions) the Mehra-Prescott (1985) model, but still there is not a solution generally accepted by the economics profession. Some of the adapted assumptions include:
• alternative assumptions about preferences (state separability, leisure, precautionary savings) or generalizations to state-dependent utility functions: Abel (1990) ; Constantinides (1990) ; Epstein and Zin (1991) ; Benartzi and Thaler (1995) ; Bakshi and Chen (1996); Campbell and Cochrane (1999) • the presence of uninsurable income shocks or incomplete markets: Mankiw (1986) ; Constantinides and Duffie (1996) ; Lucas (1996) and (1997); Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1999) , • relative volatility of stocks and bonds: Asness (2000) • limited stock market participation and limited diversification: Saito (1995), Basak and Cuocco (1998) , Heaton and Lucas (2000) , Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) , Gomes and Michaelides (2005) , • distinguishing between the cash flows to equity and aggregate consumption: Brennan and Xia (2001) , who claim to be able to justify an equity premium of 6%.
• borrowing constraints: Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) There are several excellent surveys of this work, including Kocherlakota (1996) , Cochrane (1997) and Mehra and Prescott (2003 and . Kocherlakota (1996) says that "while there are several plausible explanations for the low level of Treasury returns, the large equity premium is still largely a mystery to economists". Rietz (1988) and Barro (2005) suggest that low-probability disasters, such as a small a large "crash" in consumption, may justify a large equity premium. However, Mehra and Prescott (1988) challenge Rietz to identify such catastrophic events and estimate their probabilities.
McGrattan and Prescott (2005) argue that the 1960-2001 HEP is mainly due to changes in taxes and regulatory policy during this period. They also say that "Allowing for heterogeneous individuals will also help quantify the effects of increased market participation and diversification that has occurred in the past two decades. Until very recently, mutual funds were a very expensive method of creating a diversified equity portfolio".
Limited stock market participation can increase the REP by concentrating stock market risk on a subset of the population. To understand why limited participation may have quantitative significance for the REP, it is useful to review basic facts about the distribution of wealth, and its dynamics over time. Mishel, Bernstein and Allegretto (2006) 
Heaton and Lucas (2000) introduced Limited Participation and Limited Diversification in an
overlapping generations model and concluded that the increases in participation of the past two decades are unlikely to cause a significant reduction in the EEP, but that improved portfolio diversification might explain a fall in the EEP of several percentage points.
There is some promising research on heterogeneity. Abel (1991) hoped that "incorporating differences among investors or more general attitudes toward risk can explain the various statistical properties of asset returns". Levy and Levy (1996) mentioned that the introduction of a small degree of diversity in expectations changed the dynamics of their model and produced more realistic results. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) introduced heterogeneity in the form of uninsurable, persistent and heteroscedastic labor income shocks. Bonaparte (2006) used micro data on households' consumption and provides a new method on estimating asset pricing models, considering each household as living on an island and taking into account its lifetime consumption path. Due to the great deal of heterogeneity across households, he replaced the representative agent with an average agent. Bakshi and Chen (2006) claim that "disentangling the equity premium into its cash flow and discounting components produces an economic meaningful equity premium of 7.31%". Shalit and Yitzhaki (2006) show that at equilibrium, heterogeneous investors hold different risky assets in portfolios, and no one must hold the market portfolio.
It is interesting the quotation in Siegel and Thaler (1997) : "no economic theorist has been completely successful in resolving the [equity premium] puzzle" ... but ..
. "most economists we know have a very high proportion of their retirement wealth invested in equities (as we do)".
The equity premium in the textbooks
This section contains the main messages about the equity premium conveyed in the finance textbooks and valuation books. Figure 6 collects the evolution of the Required Equity Premium (REP) used or recommended by the textbooks and by the academic papers mentioned on previous sections. Table   14 contains the equity premium recommended and used in different editions of several textbooks. Ritter Table 14 , it is quite obvious that there is not much consensus, creating a lot of confusion among students and practitioners (and finance authors, also) about the Equity Premium. 
Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe
In all editions they recommend REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP vs. T-Bills, using Ibbotson data.
In (1988, 2 nd edition), they considered (pages 243-4) that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP versus TBills for 1926-1988 = 8.5% (12.1% -3.6%) and used it on page 287. In (1993, 3 rd edition), they also recommended 8.5%. In (1996, 4 th edition), they considered (page 241) that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP versus T-Bills for 1926-1994 = 8.5% (12.2% -3.7%) and used it on page 280. 30 They report on page 194 the Ibbotson geometric HEP versus the T-Bonds in the period 1926-1988 (5.4%) . 31 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1995, 2 nd ed., page 268):"We recommend using a 5 to 6% market risk premium for U.S. companies. This is based on the long-run geometric average risk premium for the return of the S&P 500 versus the return on long-term government bonds from 1926 to 1992". 32 6.5% is the arithmetic HEP of 2-year returns in the period 1926-1998 (see page 220). The arithmetic HEP of 1-year returns was 7.5%, and the geometric HEP was 5.9%. 33 5.5% is the arithmetic mean of 10-year holding periods returns from 1903 to 2002. The arithmetic mean of 1-year returns is 6.2%, according to exhibit 10.5 of Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005) .
In (1999, 5 th edition), they considered (page 259) that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP versus TBills for 1926-1997 = 9.2% (13% -3.8%), used it on page 261, and said "It is generally argued that the best estimate for the risk premium in the future is the average risk premium in the past".
In (2002, 6 th edition), they considered (page 259) that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP versus TBills for 1926-1999 = 9.5% (13.3% -3.8%) and used it on pages 274 and 324. 34 However, on page 286 they used a REP = 8%.
Bodie, Kane and Marcus
In (1993, 2 nd edition, page 549), they used a REP = EEP = 6.5% (14.5%-8%) to value HewlettPackard. They justified it by saying "Suppose the consensus forecast for the expected rate of return on the market portfolio in 1990 was about 14.5%".
35
In the 3 rd edition (1996, page 535), they used a REP = EEP = HEP -1% = 7.75% to value Motorola 36 . In the 5 th edition (2002, page 575), they valued Motorola using a REP = 6.5% (12.5%-6%) 37 .
In the 6 th edition (2003) In the first edition (1996), he used (page 251) a REP of 5.5% to value Boeing. On page 48, he shows that 5.5% is the geometric HEP versus T-bonds in the period 38 The R-squared of the regression is 49% and the t-statistics of the coefficients are 5.94 and 1.10 respectively.
Copeland and Weston
In (1979, page 295), they used a REP = 10% (17%-7%), and on page 321 they used 9.83%. In their 3 rd edition (1988) they used the same values (see pages 458 and 531). Weston and Copeland (1992, page 407) , used a REP = 5% (9%-4%), and on page 944 a REP = 5%
(11%-6%).
Van Horne
In (1968, 1 st ed., page 215), he still did not mention the CAPM or the market risk premium.
In (1983, 6 th ed., page 215), he used a REP = 6% (13% -7% Then the risk premium on the market portfolio is 8%." The CAPM tells us that asset prices are a function of the risk aversion of the representative investor and of the variancecovariance structure of the universe of assets. If the form of the utility function and the coefficient of risk aversion are both known, then knowledge of the variance-covariance of the universe of assets (or the variance of the portfolio of risky assets) is sufficient to identify the spread between risky and riskless asset portfolios. 40 They also mention another method to calculate the cost of equity: the "bond yield plus risk premium method". Under this approach, the cost of equity is equal to the "yield to maturity on the company´s long-term debt plus a typical risk premium of 3-4%, based on experience." Brealey and Myers (1984 , 1988 , 1991 , 1996 ) Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (1988 , 1993 , 1996 ; Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2003) ; Pratt (2002) Weston, Mitchel and Mulherin (2004) , Palepu, Healy and Bernard (2004) Arithmetic -survivor bias McKinsey (2000 McKinsey ( , 2005 ; Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1996) Geometric McKinsey (1990 McKinsey ( , 1995 ; Damodaran (1994 Damodaran ( , 1996 Damodaran ( , 1997 Damodaran ( , 2001b Damodaran ( , 2001c Damodaran ( , 2002 Damodaran ( , 2006 ; Stowe et al (2002) ; Hawawini and Viallet (2002); Bruner (2004) Damodaran (2001a) ; Arzac (2005) "No oficial position" Brealey and Myers (2000 "different investors have different REPs" Fernandez (2001 "No one knows what the REP is" Penman (2003) In the following section we claim that the confusion comes from the fact that there is not a REP We can find out an inve stor's REP by asking him, although for many investors the REP is not an explicit parameter but, rather, an implicit one that manifests in the price they are prepared to pay for 41 Even then, this method requires knowing the expected growth of dividends. A higher growth estimate implies a higher premium. 42 Reallocating terms in equation (1), we get:
REP = HEP vs. T-Bills vs. T-Bonds
Arithmetic
REP = IEP
There are many pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy the Gordon equation at any moment. All the papers that we revised on section 5 assume that there is an "expected growth rate for the market" and get an "IEP for the market". But without homogeneous expectations, there is not an "expected growth rate for the market".
Similarly, for having an EEP common for all investors we need to assume homogeneous expectations (or a representative investor) and, with our knowledge of financial markets, this assumption is not reasonable. A theory with a representative investor cannot explain either why the annual trading volume of most exchanges more than double the market capitalization.
We also find that the difference (IEP -g), 45 is related to the risk free rate in the period after 1960. between (IEP -g) and the risk free rate in the three markets. 43 An example: An investor is prepared to pay 80 euros for a perpetual annual cash flow of 6 euros in year 1 and growing at an annual rate of 3%, which he expects to obtain from a diversified equity portfolio. This means that his required market return is 10.5% ([6/80] + 0.03). 44 As Mas-Colell et al. (1995, page 120) say, "it is not true that whenever aggregate demand can be generated by a representative consumer, this representative consumer's preferences have normative contents. It may even be the case that a positive representative consumer exists but that there is no social welfare function that leads to a normative representative consumer." 45 We calculate (d 1 /P 0 -R F ) that is equal to (IEP -g) Jan-80 Jan-81 Jan-82 Jan-83 Jan-84 Jan-85 Jan-86 Jan-87 Jan-88 Jan-89 Jan-90 Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06
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Spain 1990 For calculating the cost of equity (required return to equity cash flows) of a company, a valuator has to answer the following question: which differential rate over current T-Bond yields do I think compensates the risk of holding the shares? If there is only an owner of the shares, we can directly ask him the question. But if it is a traded company, the valuator has to make a prudential judgment. As Grabowski (2006) , points out, "the entire appraisal process is based on applying reasoned judgment to the evidence derived from economic, financial and other information and arriving at a well reasoned opinion of value".
We need the cost of equity to discount the expected equity cash flows of the company. Note that there is a kind of schizophrenic approach to valuation: while all authors admit that different valuators and investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows, most authors look for a unique discount rate. It seems as if the expectations of equity cash flows are formed in a democratic regime, while the discount rate is determined in a dictatorship. In any market, different investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows and different evaluations of its risk (that translate into different discount rates). Then, in the case of a traded company, there are investors that think that the company is undervalued (and buy or hold shares), investors that think that the company is ove rvalued (and sell or not buy shares), and investors that think that the company is fairly valued (and sell or hold shares). The investors that did the last trade, or the rest of the investors that held or did not have shares do not have a common REP (nor common expectations of equity cash flows).
For calculating the REP, we must answer the same question, but thinking in a diversified portfolio of shares, instead in just the shares of a company. In the valuations that I have done in the 21 st century I have used REPs between 3.8 and 4% for Europe and for the U.S. Given the yields of the T-Bonds, I think 46 that an additional 4% compensates the additional risk of a diversified portfolio.
Conclusion
The equity premium (also called market risk premium, equity risk premium, market premium and risk premium), is one of the most important, discussed but elusive parameters in finance. Much of the confusion arises from the fact that the term equity premium is used to designate four different concepts (although many times they are mixed): Historical Equity Premium (HEP), Expected Equity Premium (EEP); Required Equity Premium (REP) and Implied Equity Premium (IEP).
The HEP is equal for all investors, but the REP, the EEP and the IEP are different for different investors. There is no an IEP for the market as a whole: different investors have different IEPs and use different REPs. A unique IEP requires assuming homogeneous expectations for the expected growth (g), but there several pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy current prices.
We show that in the finance literature and in valuation textbooks, there are authors that claim different identities among the four equity premiums defined above: some claim that HEP = EEP = REP;
others claim that EEP is smaller than HEP; others claim that there is a unique IEP and that REP = 46 And also my clients that are able to answer to that question.
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Equity Premium: Historical, Expected, Required and Implied IESE Business School 35 IEP; others "have no official position"; others claim that EEP is near zero; others try to find the EEP doing surveys; others affirm "that no one knows what the REP is".
We claim that different investors have different REPs and that it is impossible to determine the REP for the market as a whole, because it does not exist. Heterogeneous investors do not hold the same portfolio of risky assets; in fact, no investor must hold the market portfolio to reach equilibrium.
There is a kind of schizophrenic approach to valuation: while all authors admit that different valuators and investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows, most authors look for a unique discount rate. It seems as if the expectations of equity cash flows are formed in a democratic regime, while the discount rate is determined in a dictatorship. In any market, different investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows and different evaluations of its risk (that translate into different discount rates).
It has been argued that, from an economic standpoint, we need to establish the primacy of the EEP,
since it is what guides investors' decisions. However, the REP is more important for many important decisions, among others, valuations of projects and companies, acquisitions, and corporate investment decisions. On the other hand, EEP is important only for the investors that hold the market portfolio.
